ABSTRACT Future wireless networks will exploit a variety of wireless technologies to provide ubiquities connectivity to mobile devices in the form of cellular, Wireless Local Area Networks, and femtocells. Inevitably, future wireless networks will be diverse in nature, employing a number of different techniques to associate the hand held devices that are deemed to use the network. Furthermore, mobile users seek for seamless connectivity, while roaming in the midst of different networks. This requires the mobile device and the wireless networks be capable of performing a vertical handover, when the mobile nodes find themselves in the vicinity of a foreign network. Regardless of the technological challenges in terms of security, data integrity and mutual authentication between participating agents remain a significant concern in heterogeneous networks. This paper explores these concerns by examining a number of solutions proposed for vertical handover, and identifies EAP Reauthentication Protocol (ERP) as a technology-independent flexible mechanism for a vertical handover. EAP-ERP satisfies the mobility requirements of future hand held devices while promising the desired security futures. In view of thoroughly exploring EAP-ERP, Casper/FDR has been used in this paper to analyze its security properties under various conditions. The results indicate that despite the initial perception, EAP-ERP lacks mutual authentication between agents, while the integrity of keying material is adequately protected.
I. INTRODUCTION
Future networks should satisfy the ever growing need for wireless throughput possibly at gigabit rates. The presence of wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi [1] , LTE [2] and HSDPA [3] on ordinary handheld devices empowers users to maintain simultaneous multi gateway connectivity to the backbone network. It enables aggregation of connections to reach the desired throughput.
From the network service providers perspective, to reach the higher wireless data rates, a number of proposals have been put forward such as Femtocell [4] , Wi-Fi hotspot [5] and the like. As shown in Figure 1 , users carrying handheld devices that support multiple wireless technologies are privileged to be connected to multiple networks concurrently.
Inevitably, the future wireless networks by nature will be heterogeneous with appealing network characteristics. Such openings have convinced many enterprises to move towards Internet of Things (IoT) [6] . Regardless of the technological solutions, the common attribute of all solutions suggests that such mobile devices must be equipped with technologies that are capable of vertical handover in heterogeneous networks to facilitate roaming.
In heterogeneous networks, when mobile nodes move from a network locality by changing the point of attachment from one technology to another or from one network administration domain to another is called vertical handover. In this paper the native network that a mobile node is associated with is referred to as the home network, while the visiting network is referred to as the foreign network. If the mobile node gets disconnected for any reason and requests a reauthentication to a previously connected network, then it is called a horizontal handover. Throughout this paper we have used the words re-authentication and horizontal handover reciprocally.
Notwithstanding the technical challenges for vertical handover, security is a major concern in terms of privacy and authenticity. One option for vertical handover is a centralized approach supported by the service providers because they own significantly large WAN fabric and the associated user credentials. Therefore some implementations such as Telstra Air [5] are rolled out enabling users to freely move from one location to another while maintaining network connectivity. However, having a centralized approach for authenticating users may not be viable because when it comes to corporation and collaboration, leading service providers are reluctant to share information.
On the other hand, in decentralized solutions regardless of the technological limitations, there can be compatibility issues in the security mechanisms used between the different networks. For instance consider a home network that uses EAP-TLS as the authentication mechanism, with a foreign network that uses EAP-PEAP. In such situations the foreign network will not be able to interpret the protocol used by the home network and hence coordinated authentication becomes a setback.
Usually, large wireless networks belong to enterprise level service providers. These networks incorporate high speed wired backbone networks and wireless technologies such as LTE, Femtocell and Wi-Fi. Moving away from such a core fabric may implicate a variety of network technologies. This may require a handover mechanism that may involve different technologies and providers. Some proposals like AKA [7] for 3GPP-WLAN [8] and 3GPP-WiMax internetworking [9] deal with such interoperability depending on the fact Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) is the core network. AKA, as one of the protocols that provide vertical handover has been extensively analyzed using Casper/FDR in [10] . The outcome of this study revealed some security concerns regarding an authentication attack. Also, the protocol failed to meet some desired security properties which could be attributed to the lack of security in the core network. Therefore, the authors introduced a new AKA protocol.
However, due to the open nature of future networks, such proposals will be ineffective and not fulfill the aspirations of the end users. Yet, there are some studies such as the application of EAP-ERP by HOKEY WG [10] , [11] addressing these issues. EAP-ERP and EAP-CRA [12] offer a flexible and secure solution for seamless connectivity regardless of the underlying technology and hence are capable of supporting future networks. Therefore, in this study we consider vertical and horizontal handover offered by EAP-ERP protocol as a model to investigate the security threats in the open architecture. Formal security verification of the protocol using Casper is discussed in this paper. The results suggest that there are some security issues in the EAP-ERP proposal.
Modeling and security verification of security protocols using automated software tools such as SPV [13] , SPIN [14] , AVISPA [15] and Casper/FDR have been used widely. However, Casper is the most well-known tool for security protocol verification, and it has been successfully applied to many protocols due to its ability to have an extensive array of features such as secure channel and cryptographic modeling with symmetric and/or asymmetric keys [10] , [16] - [18] .
The main drawback in using Casper toolset is the issue of handling large protocols, because a large amount of memory is required to execute the refinement check algorithm [16] , [19] . To overcome this issue during modeling EAP-ERP, particularly including EAP-TLS as the home authentication mechanism and the fact that there are four agents in the system, we had to optimize the Casper input file in a way to facilitate a quicker compile time. We achieved this by splitting large messages into two.
Security verification of protocols using communication sequential process (CSP) [20] , failure divergence refinement (FDR) [21] and Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) [22] in discovering attacks have been applied in some studies such as [23] and [24] . However, the modeling of protocols and associated properties in CSP or SAL is very error prone and complicated. To respond to this concern, a new compiler known as Casper was introduced by Gavin Lowe [19] for CSP. This compiler accepts an abstract description of the protocol and translates it into CSP. This study offers the following contributions; use of Casper in a four agent security analysis (most analysis is done with two or three agents). The strengths and weaknesses of EAP-ERP are analyzed under four different scenarios for vertical and horizontal handover. The process that we have used can be adopted by other researchers. In terms of vertical handover we have analyzed EAP-ERP first in the absence of an underlying authentication mechanism required for the bootstrap process. Next, the impact of a home authentication mechanism like EAP-TLS has been analyzed. Further, in terms of horizontal handover we have analyzed EAP-ERP first with a compromised RADIUS key and thereafter without RADIUS key being compromised. Generally Casper output is not easily intelligible; therefore we have refined all of the Casper direct output and illustrated them with the aid of diagrams. Furthermore all assertions proved true by Casper have been discussed and the causes explained. In this way we not only have identified the strengths but also have analyzed it.
The rest of this paper is organized in five sections. Section II gives an overview of some of the wireless authentication proposals for roaming enabled network protocols categorized as technology dependent and independent. A brief description of the Casper environment is also provided at the end of this section. Section III gives an overview of EAP-ERP full authentication process and describes the process of modeling in Casper. The results of the security analysis are also provided in this section. Section IV includes the modeling and security analysis of EAP-ERP, with EAP-TLS as the home authentication mechanism. EAP-ERP horizontal hand over is analyzed in section V. In Section VI we discuss the results and sum up modeling and analysis. Authors use the Access Service Network (ASN) gateway that provides mobility for WiMAX to interact with normal Wi-Fi access point as WiMAX Base Station (BS). This task can be handled by a mapping function inside the access point mapping all 802.11 events as R6 events. For example, the event association request will be mapped to WiMAX preattachment request. This idea puts the authentication load on a remote and far AAA server of WiMAX network. Logically it creates problems for local users in connecting to the network, when the WiMAX connectivity is down and they do not propose any backup mechanism.
II. RELATED WORK
One applied mechanism in Wi-Fi environment is Eduroam that has been designed and implemented by European educational institutes [26] - [28] . This service provides users with secure Internet access when they roam between participating academic institutions. To authenticate a user, education roaming uses a series of hierarchical authentication servers. Each institution has a RADIUS server as its authentication server, which is connected to the federation level RADIUS server. The Federation level authentication servers are also connected to the global RADIUS server. When a user comes to a foreign network, the user credentials are checked by the RADIUS server of the visited network. If the user does not belong to the network, it requests the federation level RADIUS server. This server is a directory of all RADIUS servers under its control and has connections to the ROOT RADIUS server. If the federation server cannot find the Home RADIUS server for the supplicant it will then forward the authentication request to the Root RADIUS server. The root server will then find the exact federation level RADIUS server. Consequently, the authentication request will be redirected to the Home Authentication server. The route for response to the supplicant is the exact reverse of the direction from Foreign to Home network [27] .
GSM is the 2G mobile standard that uses EAP-SIM [29] , but it is not suited for 3G network which demands more secure procedures for authentication. To respond to such a need Arkko et al. [7] , [30] used a combination of 3G authentication with key agreement mechanism specified in UMTS. In their work which is called EAP-Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA) they use longer keys than EAP-SIM. AKA is a challenge-response method and applies symmetric cryptography. In this method both identity module and Home server have an agreement on a secret key. Home server, which is a 3G authentication server hosted by the telecommunication provider creates an authentication vector based on the secret key and a sequence number. Components of the vector are RAND, AUTN, XRES, 128-bit IK and one encryption key CK. The server passes the RAND and AUTM to the identity module of the supplicant. Identity module verifies AUTN and then sends RES the result of authentication, to the server, then the server is able to check the user identity, provided that RES is valid, then the user will be authenticated successfully. If everything goes well then both end uses IK and CK to secure the communication.
B. FLEXIBLE AND TECHNOLOGY INDEPENDENT SOLUTIONS FOR VERTICAL HANDOVER
The methods discussed earlier are designed for a limited combination of a particular network architecture such as Edu-roaming is for Wi-Fi, AKA [7] for UMTS. However EAP-ERP and EAP-CRA [31] claim a technology independent authentication in a foreign network.
The principal notion behind the EAP-CRA authentication mechanism is that every wireless device will primarily be associated with one wireless network, which can be referred to as its HOME network. The credentials used by a wireless device to associate with its HOME network are assumed to be robust and specific to that network. Therefore, a wireless device must be able to use its authority in the HOME network to reliably associate with any other FOREIGN network. In this context, the AAA server that authorizes the wireless device in its home network is called as the HOME AAA Server (HAS) and the AAA server in a foreign network is called the FOREIGN AAA Server (FAS). Hence, this authentication mechanism requires only one set of credentials that it uses in the home network, to access any foreign networks. EAP-CRA considers both different types networks and authentication mechanisms that may be specific and effective to that type of network. Further details of the EAP-CRA protocol can be found in [16] .
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The Enhanced CRA protocol provides authentication in two modes; Full Authentication and Re-Authentication. With regard to mutual authentication CRA uses RADIUS servers as suggested in IEEE 802.1x [17] . RADIUS protocol exhibits better performance compared to other mutual authentication protocols [18] . CRA suggests direct communication between radius servers by pre-arranged agreement or the servers could find each other dynamically. In case the RADIUS servers do not have a pre-arranged agreement they can use their CA-signed PKI certificates to ascertain trust between servers.
All AAA servers that participate in the CRA must possess a CA-signed PKI certificate and be capable of obtaining the CA-signed PKI certificates of other participating AAA servers. Assuming that all AAA Servers that participate in the CRA are in possession of their CAsigned PKI certificates, the CRA protocol can communicate between the FOREIGN and the HOME AAA servers securely.
Narayanan and Dondeti [11] proposed an extension to EAP method to support Re-Authentication process known as EAP-ERP. The proposal introduces two new messages to the EAP-Messages -EAP-Initiate and EAP-Finish; both these messages are used in the process of Re-Authentication. EAP-ERP is presented in RFC 5296, however a more recent version is discussed in RFC 6696 [32] . In this paper we have modelled this latest version published by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
Based on the location of EAP Authentication server there are two scenarios which shape the protocol to address these situations. The first scenario is when a peer is performing a Re-Authentication or horizontal handover in its home domain. In addition, the second scenario comes to play when a peer is trying to get authenticated in the Foreign Network.
When a supplicant moves to a new network, it first performs a full authentication with its associated home server through the Foreign Network. This process is also called bootstrap; in these circumstances the visited network almost plays a role of an intermediate medium to redirect all the requests to the home network.
C. VERIFYING SECURITY PROTOCOLS USING CASPER
Analysis of security protocols is carried out in two parts. The goal of the first step is to generate a theoretical model of the protocol in CSP [20] and/or SAL [33] . The next step involves verifying the security assertions of the protocol by model checkers such as Failure-divergence refinement (FDR) [21] . However, generating CSP description of a system or a protocol can be fallible and difficult, to overcome this issue Casper was developed by Gavin Lowe [19] . Casper generates a CSP file from a user-friendly input notation. The CSP file can then be processed by FDR2 or FDR3. In the case of security gaps Casper generates the associated attack scenarios. The input file in Casper notation consists of eight headers as shown in Table 1 . Each agent participating in a protocol is considered as a CSP process, this conception is true for an intruder as well. This method has been applied to a number of protocols such as EAP-AKA [34] , [35] . A sample of Casper input file for EAP-ERP including EAP-TLS as the home authentication mechanism is provided in the Appendix1.
III. MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF EAP-ERP FULL AUTHENTICATION

In this section, we first model the EAP-ERP protocol in
Casper and then analyze it to investigate its strengths and weaknesses in terms of the security features during vertical handover.
A. FULL AUTHENTICATION PROCESS OF EAP-ERP
The full authentication process begins with the Access Point (FAP) issuing EAP-Request/identity. In response the supplicant sends the EAP-Response including its identity together with the identity of the home domain. These two messages are shown as M1 and M2 in Figure 2 . The access point forwards the response from the supplicant to the EAP Server as message M3. Upon receiving M3 the EAP server forwards the EAP-Response together with its realm and Domain Specified Root Key (DSRK) request as message M4 to the Home Authentication Server (HAS). The identity value inside the response message M3 identifies the During the full authentication process, EAP-ERP method employs an additional authentication method to obtain the master session key from the home network. As a result, before proceeding to compose Casper notations for EAP-ERP, the impact of the underlying authentication method should be taken into consideration. For credible analysis we examined the protocol, first by neglecting the underlying protocol, and then including the underlying authentication protocol. Evidently, the embedded authentication mechanism must be a secure solution not to convey any weaknesses to EAP-ERP. Thus, prior to our experiment, EAP-TLS was selected since it has been extensively analyzed using SPIN [36] , [37] and Casper [38] . All analysis confirm that EAP-TLS delivers the required security requirements listed in RFC 4017 [39] .
In the following sections we analyze EAP-ERP full authentication and re-authentication.
B. EXCLUSIVE ANALYSIS OF EAP-ERP VERTICAL HANDOVER
When a mobile node roams in a network other than its native network, the foreign network facilitates vertical handover for the mobile node enabling it to undergo a full authentication process with the Home server. The Home server authenticates the requesting mobile node, and provides the foreign server with DSRK -keying material for the privacy of the concurrent session. In this case, the foreign network simply acts as a forwarder.
Listing 1 shows the Casper model for EAP-ERP protocol. Under #Free variables heading ''kbc'' and ''kcd'' represent the RADIUS pre-shared keys and ''msk'' stands for Master Session Key. Under the #Processes heading the access point (''b'') in foreign network plays the role of an initiator while the supplicant takes the role of the responder with the ability to generate both MSK and DSRK -this key will be used for re-authentication process in future. The ability of the home server to generate the ''msk'' and ''DSRK'' indicates that the home server and the supplicant are the only agents capable of generating these tokens. From the intruder's point of view, the identity of all four participants is visible and the RADIUS key is vulnerable as listed under the #Intruder Information section.
The #Process section of the model indicates that there are four agents involved in the process of authenticating #Process heading also reflects the initial knowledge of agents. The values inside the parentheses are initial knowledge of an agent before commencing the authentication process. For example ''RESPONDER(a, d, msk, DSRK) generates msk, DSRK'' means that the supplicant knows its identity ''a'' and that of the home server ''d''. The values of ''msk'' and ''DSRK'' are not known to the supplicant initially; however as the keyword ''generates'' indicate, the supplicant will know these values at some point during the communication by creating them.
The #Protocol description heading defines the actual messages exchanged between two agents. Initially, it is assumed that the identity of the supplicant (''a'') is given to foreign access point (''b'') as shown in Message 0, otherwise the process of authentication would not commence. As listed in the model there are eight messages exchanged between the supplicant and the server.
The #Intruder Information section specifies the initial knowledge of the intruder. In this case the intruders know the identity of all agents participating in EAP-ERP. #Intruder Information Intruder = Kevin IntruderKnowledge= Crackable= SessionKey The security requirements of the system are defined under the #Specification heading. Because of space limitations the assertions are listed in Table 2 . The lines starting with the keyword Secret define the secrecy properties of the protocol. The Secret (d,msk, [c] ) specifies that ''msk'' is kept secret between d and c. Such assertions can verify the privacy of the keying material. The first thirteen assertions listed in Table 2 are related to keeping ''msk'' and ''DSRK'' secret between agents. The lines starting with Agreement define the protocol's authenticity properties; for instance Agreement (a, c, []) specifies that agent ''a'' is correctly authenticated to c using the token inside the bracket.
For comprehensive security analysis of the protocol, in total twenty three assertions were examined against the model. Casper generated counter examples for six assertions discussed as three attack scenarios below. Table 2 lists seventeen verified specifications of which thirteen are related to the secrecy properties of EAP-ERP, the remaining four specifications verify the mutual agreement between agents. As a result of RADIUS adopting symmetric key encryption, Casper fails to generate any counter examples for the first thirteen entries that highlight the privacy of ''msk' and ''DSRK'' key.
For the same reason, the access point and foreign server can trust each other relying on the fact that possession of ''kbc'' is a necessary condition for a trustworthy agent to participate in the communication. These properties are confirmed using the Agreement assertions listed in Table 2 . 
1) FIRST ATTACK SCENARIO
Although EAP-ERP protects the keying material with the aid of RADIUS protocol, there are some concerns in regards to the mutual authentication. Table 3 lists two agreement specifications associated with the first attack scenario. The corresponding counter example generated by Casper is shown in Listing 2 and is illustrated in Figure 3 .
Listing 2. First attack generated by Casper is as below.
As shown in Listing 2, the intruder can intercept the identity request (message 1) and masquerade as a supplicant with the Access Point (FAP). Furthermore, messages 3 and 4 can also be intercepted. The attack will be deemed complete when the intruder deceives the HAS by forwarding the intercepted messages obtained from the FAS. The HAS is made to believe that it is getting the request from a legitimate supplicant forwarded by a trusted foreign authentication server. Consequently, the home server generates message 5 that includes ''mSK'' and ''dSRK'' as shown in the listing. This asserts that the Home Server has trusted both intruder-supplicant and the intruder-foreign authentication server. This attack is analogous to a replay attack. Figure 3 illustrates the above attack where the intruder agents are highlighted in red color and the legitimate communications between trusted parties highlighted in solid blue line. The message numbers used in the figure correspond to the message numbers in the Casper Listing 2. 
2) SECOND ATTACK SCENARIO
The next attack scenario produced by Casper is against agreement assertions listed in Table 4 . The first assertion reveals that the foreign authentication server fails to prove its legitimacy to the supplicant. The second assertion corresponds to the authenticity between the supplicant and the access point. The corresponding counter example generated by Casper is shown in Listing 3 and is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Listing 3 is a more detailed version of the counter example showing the complete run of the protocol. With message 5, that includes ''mSK'' and ''dSRK'', Listing 3. Second attack generated by Casper is as below.
the intruder-home-authentication server is in possession of ''mSK'' and ''dSRK''. Consequently, the intruder-foreignauthentication server and the access point will be in possession of the ''mSK''. Figure 4 shows the graphical representation of the attack. The counter example from Casper suggests that this is a type of replay attack carried out by an intruder to deceive the supplicant. In Figure 4 for each legitimate message (blue line) initiated by a trusted source there is a duplicate message (red line) from the intruder agents. In this case the legitimate supplicant regards the intruder FAP and FAS as valid foreign agents.
FIGURE. 4. Second attack scenario on EAP-ERP.
3) THIRD ATTACK SCENARIO
Casper generated a third attack scenario for the two assertions shown in Table 5 . The first specification relates to the mutual authentication between the supplicant and the foreign authentication server. The next specification is connected to authenticating the home authentication server with the foreign authentication server. Listing 4 shows the counter example generated by Casper for this attack scenario. Accordingly, the intruder home authentication server acquires the ''mSK'' and ''dSRK''. The attack scenario is further illustrated in Figure 5 . As shown in Figure 5 , the intruding agent (I_STA) introduces itself as a valid supplicant by replaying message 2 to the FAP. The FAP dispatches message 3 for the FAS. However, this message is intercepted by the intruder impersonating as the foreign authentication server (I_FAS). The intruder replays message 3 pretending to be the access point (I_FAP). At this point, the FAS decrypts message 3 received from the intruder and encrypts message 4 using the pre-shard key between the foreign and the home server.
Message 4 is then intercepted by the intruding agent (I_HAS), and forwarded to the HAS. The HAS positively authenticates the supplicant since it sees the request as legitimate. Next, Message 5 is composed for the FAS by HAS. This message is also intercepted by the intruder (I_HAS), and then forwarded to the FAS.
In this instance, both assertions are proven false. The FAS believes that the STA is legitimate, because it is authenticated by the HAS. The FAS also believes it is communicating with a trusted HAS, assuming that the received message has been encrypted by a legitimate HAS using ''kcd''.
Thus far the analysis of EAP-ERP is done without considering the underlying home authentication mechanism. In the following section we consider Casper model for EAP-ERP with EAP-TLS as the underlying home authentication scheme.
C. EAP-ERP VERTICAL HANDOVER INCORPORATING EAP-TLS
In this section, we present the results of the security analysis of EAP-ERP incorporating a home authentication mechanism -EAP-TLS. Since the input and output listings from Casper are significantly large, the figures outlining the attack scenario are not provided here.
Listing 5. Casper input file for EAP-ERP full authentication considering EAP-TLS AS HOME authentication method.
As seen in Listing 5, the protocol description is defined in twenty three messages. Messages 14, 15, 16 and 17 are split into two portions to avert state space explosion, 390 VOLUME 4, 2016 otherwise compile time will increase exponentially [40] . The ''%'' notation in the protocol description means that the receiver doesn't decrypt the message, but simply forwards it to the next agent. The intruder is assumed to know all the agents and ''kbc'' is vulnerable. Table 6 lists four agreements, for which Casper generated a counter example. Our analysis on Casper output confirms that EAP-ERP incorporating EAP-TLS is also subject to similar security issues as revealed in the previous section. However, the Casper output highlights a slight security enhancement since Agreement (a,b) and Agreement (a,d,[]) will no longer be a security concern. This improvement is due to the use of EAP-TLS during bootstrap or the full authentication process in EAP-ERP. Therefore the supplicant can trust the Home server since only the home server is able to authenticate the supplicant.
Listing 6 shows the attack generated by Casper. This is a replay attack carried out by the intruder. As seen in the listing, the intruder replays each valid message originated from a trusted agent.
IV. MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF EAP-ERP RE-AUTHENTICATION
Security analysis for horizontal handover in EAP-ERP is described in this section. EAP-ERP does not require the home server in this process, therefore only three agents are involved in the re-authentication process and the foreign server will validate the identity of the supplicant.
After initial authentication the supplicant and the EAP server are able to generate the keying materials for re-authentication process. Possessing ''DSRK'' and ''realm'' enables the EAP server to generate re-authentication root (rRK) key from which re-authentication integrity key (rIK) will be derived. The supplicant is able to generate rRK and rIK from EMSK as well. Table 7 below demonstrates the definition of keying materials used in this protocol.
The re-authentication process is shown in Figure 6 . When the supplicant requests to be re-authenticated after being full authenticated, the server in the foreign network is capable of generating new keying material without referring to the home network. After receiving EAP initiate/re-authentication (M1) from an access point in the foreign network the supplicant composes an EAP-Initiate/re-auth identity containing KeyName-NAI, a sequence number and message authentication check by the use of rIK. This message (M2) will be simply encapsulated in RADIUS packet by the AP and forwarded as a new message (M4) to the EA server. The server verifies the MAC, and the user identity. Also the server generates rMSK by using the sequence number obtained from the message. The EAP-Finish Message along with rMSK, Sequence number+1 and MAC (M4) will be sent to the associated AP. After storing the rMSK value the AP will send rest of the message to the Supplicant. The Supplicant will generate the keying material in the same way by using the sequence number as the input to the key generation process. The authentication is successful when the supplicant verifies the MAC value of the received message. In this way the supplicant also authenticates the server.
Listing 7 shows the Casper model for EAP-ERP re authentication. It is assumed that session keys ''MSK'' and ''kbc'' (RADIUS key) both can be compromised.
Twelve assertions were verified against the above model and Casper did not generate any attack scenarios for the four assertions listed in Table 8 . The attack scenarios generated by Casper are discussed in the following sections.
1) ATTACK SCENARIO FOR EAP-ERP RE-AUTHENTICATION
As shown in Figure 7 the intruder carries out a man-inthe-middle attack by impersonating as FAP, STA and FAS. The intruder positions itself between the FAP and STA and forwards the intercepted message 1 to the supplicant. Similarly, the intruder intercepts and forwards all other messages between the legitimate agents. Intercepted message 3 is forwarded to the FAS by the intruder convincing the server that the request originated from a legitimate STA. Consequently, the server generates message 4 containing ''MSK'' and ''EAP success'' and forwards it to the FAP. Assuming that the RADIUS key (kbc) could be compromised the attacker can exploit the ''MSK'' and ''EAP-Success'' from message 4. Eventually message 5 is generated and forwarded to the supplicant by the intruder misleading the supplicant. This leads to the situation whereby the supplicant believes that it has been authenticated to a legitimate access point.
For the EAP-ERP model shown in Listing 7, Casper generated a counter example for the eight assertions in Table 9 . We have included RADIUS as the carrier of EAP-ERP messages between the access point and the foreign authentication server. The attack scenario shown in Listing 8 covers all of the security flaws in EAP-ERP re-authentication process.
For further analysis we did remodel the re-authentication process under the assumption that RADIUS key ''kab'' is not ''crackable'' so it would not be compromised. Our experiment revealed that all six assertions related to the secrecy properties listed in Table 9 proved to be true. Table 10 presents the summary of results from two different scenarios of vertical handover for EAP-ERP. Twenty three assertions were formulated to comprehensively scrutinize the security features under two assumptions; first, EAP-ERP with EAP-TLS as the underlying home authentication protocol, and second EAP-ERP without using any home authentication mechanism. EAP-ERP with no underlying authentication mechanism shows no security vulnerabilities on the secrecy of keying material. This is confirmed by establishing the thirteen assertions composed to verify the secrecy properties as true. On the other hand, in terms of agreement assertions only four assertions proved true and the remaining six produced counter examples. Interestingly, the inclusion of a home authentication mechanism such as EAP-TLS, slightly improved the security. The only improvement compared to EAP-ERP with no TLS is the number of proved agreements. From our analysis it is evident that Agreement (a, b) and Agreement(a, d, []) will no longer be a security concern because of the inclusion of EAP-TLS in the modeling equation. Table11, presents the results of experiments for two scenarios of horizontal handover for EAP-ERP. Twelve assertions were formulated to comprehensively scrutinize the security features of EAP-ERP under two assumptions; 1. RADIUS key is compromised and 2. RADIUS key is not compromised. If the RADUIS key in re-authentication process is compromised all six assertions associated with the secrecy of the keying material was proved false. EAP-ERP shows no security vulnerabilities on the keying material when the RADIUS key is not compromised. On the other hand in terms of agreement assertions only four assertions proved true and remaining two produced counter examples. Interestingly for the mutual authentication of agents the state of RADIUS key being compromised makes no difference.
V. DISCUSSION
Considering the fact that EAP-ERP enhances the functionality of EAP framework by enabling users to perform re-authentication, it should also be noted that this extension introduces some drawbacks as well. First of all, it entails modification to the original EAP messaging format. The second issue is the bootstrap process. When the peer for any reason has not been able to obtain the realm of the foreign network, then it has to perform the full authentication to obtain the MSK. The third problem is related to the full authentication process where the MSK inside message 5 is only encapsulated inside the RADIUS packet. Since this key is the primary basis of identity for rest of the communication, it demands a more secure approach to deliver it. Finally, the full authentication process introduces additional overheads depending on the home authentication method used. For instance, in cases where the home network's native authentication method is EAP-TLS, a considerable number of messages have to be exchanged to acquire the keying material.
VI. CONCLUSION
Heterogeneous networks inevitably demand coordinated authentication to facilitate vertical handover. EAP-ERP and EAP-CRA are two proposals that offer technology independent vertical handover. In view of comparing the security properties of the two protocols, in this study we have investigated the strengths and weaknesses EAP-ERP using Casper/FDR. For vertical handover, we have analyzed the protocol with and without EAP-TLS as the underlying home authentication protocol. In both cases the secrecy property was confirmed robust with thirteen assertions proved. In the case of mutual authentication, the presence of EAP-TLS as the underlying home authentication method marginally enhanced the security as opposed to not having EAP-TLS.
We also investigated the security of EAP-ERP during horizontal handover. It was revealed that the secrecy property is feeble if the RADIUS key is compromised exposing the keying material. On the other hand, secrecy of the keying material is fully protected with uncompromised RADIUD key. Next, mutual authentication between agents proved to be weak in both cases with foreign authentication server unable to form a trust relationship with the supplicant.
Having completed the security analysis of EAP-ERP, next we intend to analyze EAP-CRA. This technology independent vertical handover mechanism leverages the advantages of public key infrastructure to establish a trust relationship between the foreign authentication server and the supplicant.
APPENDIX
Casper Input file for EAP-ERP incorporating EAP-TLS as the home authentication mechanism.
